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IF YOU DON’T HAVE A COW (OR CHICKEN OR PIG), YOU CAN’T 
CALL IT MEAT: WEAPONIZING THE DORMANT COMMERCE 





Industrial meat producers and proponents of plant-based diets are locked 
in legislative and litigation battles. On the legislative battlefront, meat 
producers are attempting to prohibit vegetarian and vegan food manufac-
turers from calling their products “meat,” “burgers,” “pork,” or other 
similar “meaty” descriptions. At the same time, animal-welfare advocates 
are urging states to pass laws to better the lives of animals in various ways, 
such as requiring meat producers to provide farm animals more space or 
other enhanced conditions. On the litigation side, both the meat producers 
and the plant-based companies are attempting to deploy the Dormant 
Commerce Clause (“DCC”) to strike down the laws inimical to their in-
dustries; but each side also ardently argues that the DCC permits the laws 
that benefit its industry. This Article describes the legislative battle and 
provides a theoretical framework for understanding how the litigation bat-
tle should be resolved under the DCC. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article charts the simultaneous rise of two different sets of laws that affect 
the animal-protection movement. First, some states are passing laws that enhance 
the lives of farm animals by requiring that meat and dairy producers give their ani-
mals more space to stand, stretch, and turn around. Second, some states are enacting 
labeling laws that prohibit words like “meat,” “burger,” or “pork” in connection with 
plant-based or cell-based alternative food.1 These two types of laws are connected 
by more than their contemporaneous passage in different states and oppositional 
stances to animal welfare; both are susceptible to challenges under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause (“DCC”) because both affect out-of-state industries.2 Plant-based 
food producers, who often align with the animal-welfare movement, must take care 
in invoking the DCC because protecting the animal-welfare laws as comporting with 
                                                   
* © 2021 Jessica Berch. All rights reserved. Lecturer-in-Law, Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law at Arizona State University; J.D., Columbia Law School. I would like to 
thank Abby Dockum for her excellent assistance in tracking down all the states’ meat-label-
ing laws and the members of the Utah Law Review for their helpful suggestions and edits.  
1 States are also passing laws prohibiting “dairy”-type terms for plant-based “milk” 
products. The same issues discussed in this Article regarding meat-labeling laws apply to 
these milk-labeling laws.  
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 
74 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
the DCC may unwittingly protect the meat-labeling laws from challenge; con-
versely, attacking the meat-labeling laws as violative of the DCC may unintention-
ally attack the animal-protection laws.3 This Article provides an analytical frame-
work based on the DCC that supports striking down meat-labeling laws while 
affirming animal-protection laws that require meat and dairy producers to provide 
their farm animals with more space.  
Although both plant-based food producers and meat and dairy farmers rely in 
part on the DCC to strike down laws inimical to their industries, the DCC is so 
dormant that some scholars have called it moribund or even entirely “dead.”4 But 
the slumbering DCC does have the potential to awaken, particularly because litiga-
tors are relentlessly poking the doctrine, hoping to prod it into doing their bidding, 
such as striking down animal-protection laws, meat-labeling laws, or both.5 This 
Article charts a path that wakes the sleeping DCC giant vis-à-vis the meat-language 
laws but leaves it slumbering when invoked against animal-protection laws. This 
analytical framework does not require changing any extant caselaw or policy, either 
when defending lawsuits challenging animal-protection laws or when pursuing law-
suits challenging meat-terminology legislation. But it requires a more nuanced un-
derstanding and application of both the DCC framework that courts have created 
and the reasons motivating the state laws challenged under the DCC.  
This Article comes at a pivotal time for the animal protection movement. A 
“wave of groundbreaking animal welfare legislation” is sweeping the country.6 
States have banned or are on the verge of banning veal crates, gestation crates, eggs 
from caged hens, animal-tested cosmetics, fur for clothing, foie gras from force-fed  
 
 
                                                   
3 The double-edged nature of the DCC has not been unnoticed. See Baylen Linnekin, 
Vegetarians and Meat Eaters Are Trying to Stifle Interstate Commerce, REASON (May 12, 
2018, 8:30 AM), https://reason.com/2018/05/12/vegetarians-and-meat-eaters-are-trying-t/ 
[https://perma.cc/9BN3-F3ES] (discussing California’s cage-free egg requirement and Mis-
souri’s meat-labeling statute).  
4 Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doc-
trinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 979–80 (2013) (describing the extraterritoriality 
doctrine as “dead, and unlikely to be revived by the current [Supreme] Court”). 
5 See, e.g., Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Richardson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (W.D. Mo. 
2019) (suit against Missouri’s meat-labeling law); Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 
(E.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (suit 
against California’s cage-free egg requirement); cf. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Co-
rey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (suit against California’s law limiting carbon emissions). 
6 See, e.g., Natasha Daly, States Across U.S. Are Taking Bold Steps Toward Protecting 
Animals, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 10, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/ani-
mals/2019/07/first-time-animal-welfare-laws-in-us-states/ [https://perma.cc/7XPE-NQ5H] 
(highlighting recent laws relating to animal welfare). 
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ducks or geese, sales of dogs from puppy mills, cat declawing, sales of shark fins, 
and displaying or exploiting exotic animals in circuses.7 In response, some meat and 
dairy producers have begun abandoning raising livestock in favor of growing 
plants.8   
Other industrial meat producers have dug in their heels, unleashing serious 
backlash against these animal-protection laws in the media, in legislative chambers, 
and in courtrooms across the country.9 Of particular importance to this Article, law-
suits have been filed challenging animal-welfare legislation on a variety of grounds, 
including the DCC.10 In addition, some state legislatures have passed laws protecting 
the farm-animal industry at the expense of plant-based companies. For example, 
Missouri became the first state to bar food manufacturers from calling any product 
“meat” unless it is “derived from harvested production livestock or poultry.”11 This 
type of law may prohibit the well-known brand Beyond Meat™ from using its trade-
name because the product “is not derived from harvested production livestock or 
poultry.”12 As of mid-2020, a dozen states have passed laws banning the use of meat-
type words for plant-based or cell-cultured products, another nine states have such 
                                                   
7 See id.; Ernesto Hernández-López, Food, Animals, and the Constitution: California 
Bans on Pork, Foie Gras, Shark Fins, and Eggs, 7 UC IRVINE L. REV. 347, 349 (2017) 
(“Since 2008, California has attempted to limit animal cruelty in food industries with policies 
directed at slaughtering immobile swine called ‘downers;’ foie gras, liver from force-fed 
ducks; shark fins; and eggs from hens in large-scale housing called ‘battery cages.’”) (foot-
notes omitted).  
8 See Tom Levitt, Why Some Farmers Are Ditching Livestock and Growing Plants In-
stead, HUFFPOST (Apr. 20, 2020, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-farmers-
ditching-livestock-growing-plants_n_5e9620b8c5b6a4470cb77646 [https://perma.cc/DXX 
3-3JL2] (discussing a push by animal activists to help farms transition to more “environmen-
tally-friendly [sic] types of agriculture”). 
9 These three lines of attack are interrelated. Attacks in the media might stir legislatures 
to enact contrary laws and prompt lawyers to challenge the extant animal-welfare laws. See 
Jen Fifield, Farmers Push Back Against Animal Welfare Laws, THE PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/state-
line/2016/11/29/farmers-push-back-against-animal-welfare-laws [https://perma.cc/YAK3-
SAR9]; N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, No. 2:19-CV-08569, 2020 WL 919153 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
24, 2020).  
10 Although this Article focuses on the DCC challenges to animal-welfare and anti-
animal-welfare laws, various other challenges may be mustered. For example, the meat-la-
beling laws may be susceptible to First Amendment challenges involving commercial 
speech, vagueness, and overbreadth. See Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 
3d 552 (E.D. Ark. 2019). Other potential challenges to animal-welfare laws include preemp-
tion. See Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065–66 (E.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d and re-
manded sub nom. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017). 
11 MO. ANN. STAT. § 265.494(7) (West 2018). Violators are subject to one year in prison 
and a $2,000 fine. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 265.496 (West 2018); see also MO. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 558.002(1)(2), 558.011(1)(6) (West 2018) (providing that those convicted of class A mis-
demeanors are subject to up to one year imprisonment and a $2,000 fine).  
12 MO. ANN. STAT. § 265.494(7) (West 2018). 
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laws pending in their legislatures, and nine states have considered, but declined to 
pass, such laws.13 This simultaneous rise of animal-protection legislation and anti-
                                                   
13 As of the end of April 2020, the following states have enacted laws banning the use 
of meat-type words for plant-based and/or cell-based products: Alabama, Arkansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, and Wyoming. See Elaine Watson, Plant-Based and Cell-Cultured ‘Meat’ 
Labeling Under Attack in 25 States, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019/05/29/Plant-based-and-cell-cultured-meat 
-labeling-under-attack-in-25-states# [https://perma.cc/R47A-5YGP]; see also ALA. CODE § 
2-17-10(d) (West 2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(6) (West 2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 217.035(15) (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:4744(B)(4) (effective Oct. 1, 2020); MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 75-35-15(4) (West 2019); MO. ANN. STAT. § 265.494(7) (West 2018); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 50-31-203(14) (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 4.1-31-05.1 (West 
2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 317(7) (West 2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-17-510 (2019); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 39-4-26 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-111(a)(xiii) (West 2020). 
Oklahoma’s law contains a carveout for plant-based meat: “product packaging for plant-
based items shall not be considered to be in violation of the provisions of this paragraph so 
long as the packaging displays that the product is derived from plant-based sources.” OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 317(7) (West 2019). In Mississippi, the legislature chose to rewrite its 
meat-labeling law rather than litigate a First Amendment challenge. Tim Cushing, After Be-
ing Sued, Mississippi Rewrites Its Unconstitutional Ban on the Use of Meat Words by Vegan 
Food Producers, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 13, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/arti-
cles/20190910/09384142957/after-being-sued-mississippi-rewrites-unconstitutional-ban-
use-meat-words-vegan-food-producers.shtml [https://perma.cc/738J-RK4E]; see also supra 
note 10 (regarding other challenges that may be brought against these laws). The following 
states legislatures are currently considering meat-labeling laws: Colorado (although a similar 
law was defeated in 2019), Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Vermont, 
and Washington. See H.B. 20-1117, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020), 
https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb20-1117 [https://perma.cc/P3YU-6JS9]; S.B. 211, 
2019-2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019), http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20192020/SB/211 [https://perma.cc/QM43-9FML]; H.B. 2556, 101st Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?Doc-
Num=2556&GAID=15&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=118663&SessionID=108&GA=101 
[https://perma.cc/PK52-BBST]; S.F. 404, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2019), 
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/BillBook?ga=88&ba=SF%20404 [https://perma.cc/ 
6R7C-X22Y]; H.B. 2437, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2020), http://www.kslegisla-
ture.org/li/b2019_20/measures/hb2437/ [https://perma.cc/C596-WEQN]; S.B. 188, 2020 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legisla-
tion/Details/SB0188?ys=2020RS [https://perma.cc/RA8S-P4NF]; H.B. 4947, 2019–2020 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-
2020/billintroduced/House/pdf/2019-HIB-4947.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6UE-3ZM9]; H. 
233, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019), https://legislature.vermont.gov/Doc-
uments/2020/Docs/BILLS/H-0233/H-0233%20As%20Introduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ 
52-6BVN]; H.B. 1519, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019), https://app.leg.wa.gov/bill 
summary?BillNumber=1519&Year=2019&Initiative=false [https://perma.cc/ER3Y-
KCSN]. The following state legislatures have considered, but declined to pass, meat-labeling 
laws for plant-based or cell-based products: Arizona, Hawaii, Indiana, Nebraska, New 
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animal legislation may put plant-based food producers, who are often aligned with 
the animal-welfare movement, in a bind: protecting the former as not violative of 
the DCC may unwittingly protect the latter and attacking the latter as violative of 
the DCC may unintentionally undermine the former. 
This concurrent rise of animal-protection legislation and meat-labeling laws 
strains our understanding of the DCC. Do both types of law survive a lenient DCC 
analysis because the state laws do have in-state benefits and effects? Do both fail a 
stringent DCC analysis because both entail burdensome out-of-state effects? Identi-
fying the framework that resolves the constitutionality of these two sets of laws re-
quires a more nuanced analysis of the DCC’s contours. 
Federal courts have inferred the DCC as a “negative corollary” from Article I’s 
Commerce Clause.14 That is, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”15 Although the Commerce Clause does not directly address 
states’ rights to pass laws affecting interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has de-
termined that the Clause implicitly prohibits states from enacting legislation that 
substantially interferes with interstate commerce.16 State laws that affect interstate 
commerce are subject to being struck down as unconstitutional,17 even though the 
                                                   
Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See H.B. 2604, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2019), https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/54leg/1R/bills/HB2604P.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/9RJC-MUYV]; S.B. 1425, 30th Leg., 2019 Sess. (Haw. 2019), https://www.capitol.ha-
waii.gov/session2019/bills/SB1425_.htm [https://perma.cc/5RMU-KH5J]; H.B. 1414, 121st 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019), http://iga.in.gov/static-documents/2/e/c/5/2ec50d 
50/HB1414.01.INTR.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QMY-HTYT]; L.B. 594, 106th Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Neb. 2019), https://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/106/PDF/Intro/LB594.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DD2V-BQY5]; HB 222, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019), 
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular/bills/house/HB0222.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/JAD9-J6TU]; S.B. 0003, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019), http://www.cap-
itol.tn.gov/Bills/111/Bill/SB0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF2K-ECDY]; H.B. 3799, 86th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019), https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/pdf/HB03799I. 
pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/RSY7-76JZ]; H.B. 2274, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Va. 2019), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?191+ful+HB2274+pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/YBQ4-9H6B]; S.B. 464, 2019–2020 Leg., Sess. (Wis. 2019), https://docs.legis.wis-
consin.gov/2019/proposals/sb464 [https://perma.cc/W3AU-8ZUP]. Virginia’s proposed law 
would have contained a carveout for products labeled as “imitation” meat.  
14 E.g., Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Steudle, 761 F. Supp. 2d 611, 626 (E.D. Mich. 
2011), aff’d, 683 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2012).  
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
16 S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (“Although the 
Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce, the Clause has long been recognized as a self-executing limita-
tion on the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such com-
merce.”). 
17 See id. 
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DCC acts primarily as a sword against state laws protecting in-state businesses or 
activities at the expense of out-of-state businesses or activities.18  
State laws protecting animal welfare may be attacked as violating the DCC be-
cause they have out-of-state effects. For example, suppose California passes a law 
requiring egg-laying hens to be provided enclosures meeting minimum space re-
quirements. In that case, the law may “interfere” with the interstate egg market be-
cause some—even most—eggs sold in California are produced in other states not 
complying with California’s minimum hen cage size standards.19 Challenging ani-
mal welfare laws as violative of the DCC is not an idle threat, as evidenced by the 
DCC-based lawsuits filed against animal-protection laws.20 Under the analysis de-
scribed in this Article, these laws can—and should—survive a DCC challenge. 
Similarly, laws that seek to protect the meat and dairy industries by restricting 
other companies’ labeling may be challenged under the DCC as having out-of-state 
effects. For example, the Missouri law banning the use of the word “meat” to de-
scribe plant-based and cell-cultured meat substitutes may “interfere” with the inter-
state advertising and sale of these alternative products. In this context as well, the 
possibility of a DCC challenge is not merely hypothetical; vegetarian and vegan food 
producers have sued, arguing that prohibiting them from describing their products 
using meat-based terms hinders their interstate businesses.21 Under this Article’s 
proposed analytical framework, these laws can—and should—fall to a DCC chal-
lenge.  
Why should the animal-protection laws pass muster while the meat-language 
laws fail? Both laws affect out-of-state businesses and interfere with the free flow 
of interstate commerce, thus triggering DCC scrutiny. Both laws also purport to pro-
vide at least some local benefits. The animal-protection laws survive, and the meat 
laws fail, because of their purposes.22 The DCC primarily attempts to quell protec-
tionist measures—laws passed with the express or implied goal of helping in-state 
business at the expense of out-of-state business or interstate commerce.23 But the 
                                                   
18 See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1996). 
19 Hernández-López, supra note 7, at 350 (“As sales bans affecting food industries out-
side California, it is nearly impossible for these policies not to impact interstate commerce.”).  
20 See, e.g., Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1062 (E.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d and 
remanded sub nom. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (detailing 
a commerce clause and supremacy clause challenge to a California law requiring all eggs 
sold in California to come from an enclosure that complies with the law’s standards).  
21 See Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Richardson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1134–35 (W.D. 
Mo. 2019).  
22 Purpose can be the stated purpose, or the purpose inferred from the legislation. See 
Huffman v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1988). In this latter context, purpose 
requires a court to consider what problem the legislature was trying to solve when it passed 
the law at issue. E.g., Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory Interpretation, 43 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1185, 1186 (2011) (describing Justice Breyer’s form of purposivism as 
“refer[ring] to the ‘purposes’ the legislature has in enacting the statute”). 
23 See infra Part II.A. 
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DCC does not generally override traditional state police powers,24 which allow a 
state to pass laws to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of its citizenry, as long 
as those laws only incidentally burden interstate commerce.25 Thus, laws passed with 
a protectionist purpose should fail, and laws passed for traditional health, safety, or 
welfare reasons should survive.  
While many animal-welfare laws have traditional health, safety, and welfare 
purposes,26 legislatures that have passed meat-language laws have been vocal in de-
scribing the purpose of such legislation as protecting meat industries against com-
petition from plant-based businesses.27 If these goals remain—protecting the health 
and safety of citizens for the animal-welfare laws and protecting the meat industry 
from competition for the meat-language laws—then the DCC should leave un-
touched the former but strike down the latter. 
This Article charts the course for sustaining animal-welfare laws under a state’s 
police power while striking down meat-language laws as protectionist measures, and 
it does so in four principal parts.28 In Part II, this Article analyzes the DCC, its ap-
plicable caselaw and policies, and explicates how the DCC leaves intact traditional 
state police powers. Part III more fully describes exemplar legislation from Califor-
nia and Missouri that typify these legal battles. Part III also discusses the current 
                                                   
24 E.g., Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 467 (1877) (“Whilst the power 
to regulate commerce is granted to Congress, that of establishing interior police regulations 
belongs to the States.”); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
545 U.S. 429, 434 (2005) (noting that the law at issue was within the state’s police powers 
and therefore not violative of the DCC). For more information on police powers, see infra 
Part II.B. 
25 Husen, 95 U.S. at 468. 
26 See Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“The stated 
purpose of [California’s statute mandating more space for egg-laying hens] is to protect Cal-
ifornia consumers from the deleterious, health, safety, and welfare effects of the sale and 
consumption of eggs derived from egg-laying hens that are exposed to significant stress that 
may result in increased exposure to disease pathogens including salmonella.”) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). 
27 Kate Gibson, Missouri First U.S. State to Ban Word “Meat” on Anything But Animal 
Flesh, CBS NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018, 5:03 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/missouri-
first-state-to-ban-word-meat-on-anything-but-animal-flesh/ [https://perma.cc/2K3N-JSDS] 
(noting the purpose of the law is to “protect ranchers”). 
28 This Article does not explore other grounds for challenging the meat-labeling laws, 
such as the First Amendment, despite the fact that such challenges seem fruitful. See supra 
note 10 for additional discussion of these other challenges. For example, in December 2019, 
Judge Kristine Baker of the Eastern District of Arkansas granted a preliminary injunction to 
prevent Arkansas from enforcing its meat-labeling law because of First Amendment con-
cerns. Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Ark. 2019); Beth Mole, 
Judge Serves Up Sizzling Rebuke of Arkansas’ Anti-Veggie-Meat Labeling Law, ARS 
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litigation on these matters. Part IV considers other scholarship in the area of animal-
welfare legislation, which roughly breaks down into two camps. In Part IV.A, this 
Article recounts scholarship that would uphold animal-welfare laws as not violating 
the DCC, but does so in language that would likely uphold laws like Missouri’s 
meat-language statute. In Part IV.B, this Article addresses scholarship that would 
strike down animal-welfare laws as violating the DCC, but does so in language that 
would also strike down laws like Missouri’s meat-language statute. In other words, 
the other scholarship on these matters generally sets up all-or-nothing analytical 
frameworks in which the two types of laws either both survive, or both fail. Finally, 
Part V of this Article posits an analytical framework for litigating and deciding these 
DCC cases in a way that distinguishes the health and safety purposes of the animal-
welfare legislation from the protectionist reasons underlying the meat-language 
laws. 
 
II.  THE REFEREES OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND LITIGATION BATTLES: 
DCC AND POLICE POWERS 
 
A.  The DCC29 
 
Implicit in the Constitution’s affirmative Commerce Clause is a negative cor-
ollary barring states from enacting legislation that substantially burdens the free flow 
of commerce;30 this negative gloss has become known as the DCC.31 Thus, the DCC 
seeks to “avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued re-
lations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confed-
eration.”32  
Litigation seeking to invalidate state laws based on the DCC meets different 
levels of scrutiny depending on the type of DCC challenge asserted. Courts have 
determined the DCC serves three functions:33 (1) an “anti-protectionist function,” 
(2) a “sovereign-capacity function,” and (3) an “anti-obstructionist function.”34 
                                                   
29 This section is based on my earlier work and research into the DCC. See Jessica 
Berch, Weed Wars: Winning the Fight Against Marijuana Spillover from Neighboring States, 
19 NEV. L.J. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Weed Wars]; Jessica Berch, Reefer Madness: How Non-
Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop Laws to Protect Themselves from Marijuana 
Spillover Flowing from Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 B.C. L. REV. 863 (2017) [hereinafter 
Reefer Madness]. 
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 
87 (1984). 
31 E.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 338 (2007).  
32 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979). 
33 See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting 
the three different DCC varieties). 
34 See Chad DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Fed-
eralism, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1005-06 (2011) 
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These different DCC functions bring different standards of review, from the restric-
tive strict scrutiny standard to a lenient rational-basis type standard. 
The anti-protectionist framework is reserved for laws that benefit in-state busi-
nesses at the expense of out-of-state businesses.35 These laws are subject to the 
“strictest scrutiny,” and courts routinely strike them down as violating the DCC.36 
After all, such laws entail the very economic Balkanization that the DCC proscribes. 
The DCC’s second function, the sovereign-capacity function, prevents a state 
from projecting its legislation into sister states.37 The DCC “precludes the applica-
tion of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s 
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State . . . .”38 These laws 
receive strict scrutiny because out-of-state businesses bear the brunt of the negative 
effects.39  
In analyzing the third category, the anti-obstructionist function of the DCC, 
courts will uphold a state statute that “regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental 
. . . unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.”40 These laws, being neutral and evenhanded, do not trig-
ger fears of protectionism and therefore are subjected to something akin to rational-
basis scrutiny.   
The first two of these frameworks—anti-protectionist and sovereign-capac-
ity—require the application of strict scrutiny. Perhaps because they receive the same 
level of scrutiny, some scholars have recognized that these two strands of the DCC 
may be collapsed into one.41 Thus, rather than focusing on three strands of the DCC, 
                                                   
(creating the nomenclature adopted in this Article). This Article provides a brief outline of 
these three different DCC challenges. For those interested in a more detailed discussion of 
these three functions, see Weed Wars, supra note 29, at 30–37.  
35 See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 345 (1996) (stating that the DCC 
“require[s] ‘justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce [to] pass the strictest 
scrutiny’”) (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 
36 Id. 
37 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935). 
38 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (citation omitted); see also BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996) (“Alabama does not have the power, 
however, to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no 
impact on Alabama or its residents.”); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 
93 (1987) (recognizing that where the “law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing 
to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law”) (citation omitted); Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582–83 (1986) (citing Healy as invalidating 
a statute because it “regulate[d] conduct occurring wholly outside the state”) (alteration in 
original); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality) (invalidating a Illinois 
statute for its “sweeping extraterritorial effect”). 
39 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579. 
40 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
41 Bethany Gullman, Unburdening the Farm: A Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge 
to Conflicting Standards in Agricultural Production, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 451, 
 
82 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
it is permissible to focus on two. First, laws that discriminate against interstate com-
merce and advance local interests over out-of-state interests are subject to strict scru-
tiny and are almost always invalidated.42 Second, laws that apply evenly to both in-
state and out-of-state commerce receive more lenient scrutiny and are more likely to 
survive a challenge.43   
Because of the interconnected web of commerce, many state laws—maybe 
most or even all—affect interstate markets in some manner,44 and so in assessing 
whether strict scrutiny or lenient balancing applies, courts consider both the effect 
of the law (whether the law discriminates against out-of-state business in favor of 
in-state interests) and its purpose (the reasons prompting the enacting state to pass 
the law).45 Courts determine the disparate effect by evaluating whether the law 
                                                   
455 (2017) (“The Supreme Court identifies two types of state statutes that improperly regu-
late interstate commerce: (1) ‘statutes that burden interstate transactions only incidentally,’ 
and (2) statutes that ‘affirmatively discriminate’ against interstate transactions.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s 
Progressive Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 427 (2015) (“Ordinarily, to determine if 
a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause, a court must decide whether the law 
discriminates against out-of-state commerce. Discriminatory laws are presumptively uncon-
stitutional and can be upheld only if justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protec-
tionism. Nondiscriminatory laws are unconstitutional if the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  
42 Gullman, supra note 41; City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 
(1978). 
43 Joshua I. Grant, Hell to the Sound of Trumpets: Why Chicago’s Ban on Foie Gras 
Was Constitutional and What It Means for the Future of Animal Welfare Laws, 2 STAN. J. 
ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 52, 72 (2009) (“Cases under the dormant Commerce Clause are ana-
lyzed under a two-tiered approach. Under the first tier, a court must determine whether a law 
on its face or in effect discriminates against interstate commerce. . . . [Discriminatory] 
statu[t]es are subject to strict scrutiny and will be struck down unless a state ‘can demon-
strate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local inter-
est.’ However, if a law does not discriminate in favor of local interests but instead regulates 
neutrally and has only incidental effects on interstate commerce, then a case is analyzed 
under the second tier of case law.”); Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; see Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. 
Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (writing that “[s]tate laws frequently survive this Pike scru-
tiny”). 
44 It is difficult to imagine a law that does not affect interstate commerce or out-of-state 
interests. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (holding that an individual grow-
ing wheat for home use affects the interstate market for wheat); see also Schmitt, supra note 
41, at 424 (“[B]ecause of the interconnected nature of the modern economy, most state reg-
ulations have some extraterritorial effects.”). 
45 See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461 
(2019) (noting that a law that has out-of-state effects may nonetheless be sustained if it is 
“narrowly tailored” to advance a “legitimate local purpose”) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
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applies evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state markets.46 Courts determine the 
purpose of the law by assessing—through usual statutory interpretation methods—
the stated purpose of any drafters or proponents of the law and by considering the 
problem the law was meant to solve.47 A law motivated by a purpose to aid in-state 
activities at the expense of out-of-state ones triggers the application of strict scrutiny; 
a law motivated by traditional police powers—to enhance the health, safety, or wel-
fare of in-state citizenry48—triggers the application of the balancing test. In other 
words, both “protectionist” and “police powers” laws may affect interstate com-
merce and may even advance in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state inter-
ests; that is, they both may have disparate effects. The principal difference in 
whether the law survives DCC analysis lies in the legislature’s (stated or unstated) 
motivation for passing the law; that is, the purpose of the law.49  
 
B.  Police Powers 
 
Police powers allow a state to regulate the health, safety, and general welfare 
of its citizenry.50 Courts generally uphold laws that advance these purposes as long 
as they are reasonable, passed in good faith, and do not violate the Constitution, 
including the DCC.51  
Many police-powers-based laws affect other states, either directly or inci-
dentally.52 That is the nature of the interconnected economy of the United States. 
But the DCC accommodates this interconnectivity and tolerates traditional police 
                                                   
46 See, e.g., Jonathan W. Garlough, Weighing in on the Wine Wars: What the European 
Union Can Teach Us About the Direct Shipment Controversy, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1533, 1541 (2005) (“The second way a state law can violate the dormant Commerce Clause 
is by clearly discriminating against interstate commerce, either facially or through the law’s 
practical effect.”). Most laws should be written neutrally so as to avoid any obvious disparate 
purposes or effects. 
47 See Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1186 (regarding statutory purpose). 
48 See infra Part II.B. 
49 It may happen that a legislature’s intent does not align with the law’s effect. More 
study of this phenomenon and its permutations is needed. As an initial reaction, this author 
believes that a law motivated by a protectionist legislative purpose, but which does not 
achieve that protectionist end, should receive strict scrutiny analysis; a law motivated by a 
non-protectionist legislative purpose, but that does turn out to have a protectionist effect, 
should perhaps also receive strict scrutiny analysis. In other words, a legislature should fairly 
certainly be held accountable for its “evil” mindset in the first permutation; and a legislature 
should perhaps be held accountable for any “evil” effect of a law it passes in the second. 
50 16A C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 707 (2020) (“It is the right and duty of a state 
possessing the police power to pass such laws as may be necessary for the preservation of 
public health.”). 
51 Id. § 717. 
52 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 379 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., con-
curring) (“The modern reality is that the States frequently regulate activities that occur en-
tirely within one State but that have effects in many.”).  
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power laws by subjecting them to the lenient balancing test that laws frequently sur-
vive.53 As the Supreme Court has stated, “the States retain authority under their gen-
eral police powers to regulate matters of ‘legitimate local concern,’ even though in-
terstate commerce may be affected.”54 Thus, the key is finding a way to distinguish 
legitimate local concern from illegitimate local protectionism. 
 
C.  The Line Between Valid Police Powers and Invalid Protectionism 
 
There is no clear line to demark laws furthering valid police powers and those 
advancing unconstitutional protectionism.55 The Supreme Court has candidly stated 
that “defining the appropriate scope for state regulation is often a matter of delicate 
adjustment.”56 At the core of this inquiry is whether the state has “place[d] itself in 
a position of economic isolation”57 based on the “practical operation” of the state 
law.58  
This question of statutory meaning, purpose, and effect plagues numerous areas 
of the law, and there are too many divergent views on how to interpret statutes to 
recount here properly.59 At least in the context of potentially protectionist laws, the 
Supreme Court has directed courts to consider the “practical operation” of the law. 
Generally, a law does what its writers intended it to do.60 Thus, the reason a law is 
passed is pertinent in deciphering whether the law is protectionist. In addition, given 
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that “practical operation” matters, how the law 
actually operates in practice, including its effects, must be considered in ascertaining 
whether or not the law is principally protectionist. 
  
                                                   
53 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (describing that the “nature 
of the local interest” matters in assessing whether a law survives a DCC challenge).  
54 Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (citation omitted).  
55 See Schmitt, supra note 41, at 428 (“The Supreme Court, however, has never clearly 
explained how the dormant Commerce Clause’s ban on extraterritorial legislation applies 
when a state directly regulates only in-state conduct, but such regulation has out-of-state 
effects.”). 
56 BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. at 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
57 Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
58 Id. at 37.  
59 Some famous texts regarding statutory interpretation include the following: ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING THE LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
(2012); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1997); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).  
60 Cf. Deweese v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 590 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 
2009) (reviewing congressional findings and statutory language to determine practical effect 
of a statute). 
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III.  TWO COMBATANTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND LITIGATION BATTLES: 
CALIFORNIA’S CAGE-FREE EGG STATUTE AND MISSOURI’S MEAT-LABELING 
STATUTE 
 
A.  California’s Cage-Free Egg Statute 
 
California leads the nation’s animal-welfare movement.61 For example, Cali-
fornia laws ban the sale of cosmetics that have been tested on animals;62 require pet 
stores to adopt dogs, cats, and rabbits that come from shelters or nonprofits;63 and 
prohibit the use of fur for new clothing and accessories,64 among others. 
California has also attempted to reduce the cruelty inflicted on animals raised 
for food.65 In 2018, California voters overwhelmingly supported Proposition 12 to 
adopt “the most progressive animal welfare protections in the world.”66 Proposition 
12 amplified earlier measures passed in 2008’s Proposition 2.67 Under Proposition 
12, effective January 1, 2020, producers who wish to sell veal in California must 
provide veal calves with at least 43 square feet of floor space; hens, chickens, tur-
keys, ducks, geese, and guinea fowl must have at least 1 square foot.68 By 2022, the 
law will protect breeding pigs, banning the sale of pork from pigs that are provided 
less than 24 square feet of space.69 Also, by 2022, all eggs sold in California must 
                                                   
61 The Animal Legal Defense Fund ranks U.S. states by the strength of their animal-
protection laws. In 2019, the most recent year for which rankings are available, California 
earned a “top tier” designation and ranked eighth. 2019 U.S. State Animal Protection Laws 
Rankings: The Best and Worst States for Animal Protection Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE 
FUND, https://aldf.org/project/us-state-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/2M97-JKPB] [hereinafter 
ALDF Rankings]; Hernández-López, supra note 7, at 349 (“Since 2008, California has at-
tempted to limit animal cruelty in food industries . . . .”); Daly, supra note 6 (listing Califor-
nia’s animal-protection legislation); see also Lynn E. Dwyer & Dennis D. Murphy, Fulfilling 
the Promise: Reconsidering and Reforming the California Endangered Species Act, 35 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 735, 742 (1995) (“California has always appeared to be a leader in its com-
mitment to environmental protection.”). 
62 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1834.9.5 (West 2019). The ban went into effect January 1, 2020.  
63 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 122354.5(a) (West 2019). The law became opera-
tive January 1, 2019. Id. § 122354.5(I). 
64 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2023 (West 2019). The ban goes into effect January 1, 
2023.  
65 Hernández-López, supra note 7, at 349 (describing how the California legislature has 
attempted to address animal suffering).  
66 Gabrielle Canon, ‘A Loud and Clear Message’: California Passes Historic Farm 
Animal Protections, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2018, 7:00 EST), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/us-news/2018/nov/08/california-animal-welfare-cage-free-eggs-prop-12-passes 
[https://perma.cc/PG87-W73R]. The law is codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 25990–94 (West 2019).  
67 Canon, supra note 66. 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
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come from “cage-free” hens as defined by the United Egg Producers’ guidelines.70 
Penalties include civil fines of $2,500 per violation and $6,000 per intentional vio-
lation.71 
In 2014, the State of Missouri, among other states, sued various California of-
ficials seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and alleging Proposition 2 was un-
constitutional and preempted.72 The states brought the suit in their capacity as parens 
patriae, asserting an interest in their in-state businesses’ financial health and suc-
cess, which they posited would be harmed if Proposition 2 went into effect.73 The 
complaint alleged the California law effectively required out-of-state egg producers 
“to comply with behavior-based enclosure standards identical to those in [Proposi-
tion] 2 if they want to continue selling their eggs in California.”74 This left the out-
of-state producers with a dilemma: they could either “incur massive capital improve-
ment costs to build larger habitats for some or all of their egg-laying hens,” or they 
could “walk away from the largest egg market in the country.”75 The complaint thus 
set forth a claim under the DCC because the California law allegedly affected out-
of-state businesses and impinged on interstate commerce. The courts never reached 
the merits of the complaint because the district court dismissed the case for lack of 
standing,76 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on that ground.77   
If this case had progressed to the merits, would Missouri have succeeded in 
having the court strike down California’s law as violative of the DCC?78 Although 
several scholars agree that California’s laws should be upheld,79 this consensus is 
                                                   
70 Id.  
71 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2019) (noting injunctions and civil 
penalties).  
72 Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2014). The preemption argument 
relies on the Federal Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1031, because one of its stated 
purposes “is to protect human health in connection with the consumption of shell eggs.” Id. 
at 1065 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Article does not address preemption 
concerns.  
73 Id. at 1068. 
74 Id. at 1063.  
75 Id. at 1063–64. 
76 Id. at 1072–75 (dismissing the case for lack of standing because the states had not 
alleged a cognizable injury; although the egg producers might suffer harm, which would 
make them appropriate plaintiffs, the states failed to allege how individuals within the state—
other than the egg producers—would be harmed). 
77 Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2017). 
78 Some of the language used by the Ninth Circuit in affirming the district court’s dis-
missal of the Missouri lawsuit on the basis of standing suggests that the judges would have 
sustained the cage-free egg law on the merits. For example, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
California erected “no trade barriers” and that the cage-free egg laws were “not discrimina-
tory.” Id. at 655. 
79 See, e.g., Rita-Marie Cain Reid, The Chicken and the Egg—Animal Welfare, Food 
Safety and Federalism, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 11 (2016) (concluding that California state 
legislation relating to egg production is likely constitutional); Grant, supra note 43, at 103–
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not unanimous,80 and much of the reasoning supporting the constitutionality of ani-
mal-welfare laws centers on a case-by-case assessment, leaving the resolution some-
what unsettled.81 This Article proposes that California’s law is a proper exercise of 
the police power and, because the law’s anti-obstructionist purpose is to protect its 
citizens’ health, safety, or welfare, it should withstand rational basis scrutiny under 
the DCC.  
 
B.  Missouri’s Meat-Labeling Statute 
 
Missouri ranks thirty-fifth for its animal-protection laws.82 In 2018, as Califor-
nia was busy introducing various animal-welfare measures, Missouri passed its own 
law inimical to the interests of the animal-protection movement.83 Missouri’s legis-
lature banned the use of the word meat to describe any product that does not come 
from “harvested production livestock or poultry.”84 Violating the statute is a Class 
A misdemeanor.85  
                                                   
04 (2009) (arguing why California’s ban on foie gras is likely to survive a constitutional 
challenge); Louis Cholden-Brown, Missouri and Indiana Lay an Egg: Why the Latest At-
tempt at Invalidating State Factory Farm Regulations Must Fail, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 179–
83 (2019) (positing that neither the California nor Massachusetts egg production laws are 
invalid under the Supreme Court’s modern DCC doctrine). 
80 See Gullman, supra note 41, at 464–69 (arguing that these laws fail the DCC analysis 
and advocating that Congress pass legislation to preempt local experimentation). 
81 See, e.g., Hernández-López, supra note 7 (describing the potential challenges to an-
imal-protection-based food laws, noting the importance of constitutional law in these mat-
ters, and describing the case-by-case balancing that must transpire). 
82 ALDF Rankings, supra note 61 (ranking Missouri #35 out of 50).  
83 Missouri is not alone in passing a state industry protection law like this, but it is 
useful to focus on one such law for the purpose of this Article. For a full list of U.S. states 
that have passed, are considering passing, or have defeated such laws, see supra note 13. Nor 
is the United States alone in considering and adopting these laws. In early 2019, the European 
Parliament’s agriculture committee approved banning plant-based foods from being named 
like their meat counterparts. See Maria Chiorando, EU Ban on ‘Meaty’ Names Would Be 
‘Unlawful,’ Claims Vegan Charity, PLANTBASEDNEWS.ORG (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.plantbasednews.org/post/eu-ban-on-meaty-names-unlawful-claims-vegan-
charity [https://perma.cc/NR47-4MM5]. When such a proposal passed in France, supporters 
touted the law would serve to protect France’s agricultural products. See Katy Askew, 
France Bans Use of Meaty Names for Veggie Food, FOODNAVIGATOR.COM (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2018/04/23/France-bans-use-of-meaty-names-for-
veggie-food [https://perma.cc/A2PQ-6RVA] (quoting French MP Jean-Baptiste Moreau us-
ing protectionist language in support of these meat-labeling laws).  
84 MO. REV. STAT. § 265.494(7) (West 2018); id. § 262.492 (defining “meat” and reg-
ulating meat advertising to ban plant-based meats from using the “meat” label, and also pro-
hibiting “clean meat”—cell-based meat—from using that label even though that meat comes 
from livestock and poultry cells because clean meats do not come from carcasses).  
85 Id. § 265.496 (West 2020).  
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Tofurky, a company that makes vegan meat alternatives, joined with other 
plaintiffs to sue the State of Missouri, seeking to enjoin the meat-labeling law.86 One 
theory of the law’s invalidity is that its protectionist purpose renders it violative of 
the DCC. Count II of the complaint alleges Missouri’s law seeks to “put Plaintiff 
Tofurky at a disadvantage in Missouri in order to protect local economic interests 
from interstate competition.”87 The complaint also alleges the law was passed “at 
the behest of in-state livestock and poultry producers who do not wish to compete 
against Plaintiff Tofurky and other plant-based meat producers’ products.”88 This 
case remains pending.89 This Article proposes that Missouri’s law has an improper 
protectionist purpose and fails under the anti-protectionist function of the DCC.90 
 
IV.  PREVIOUS PREDICTIONS OF THE DCC BATTLES: EITHER TWO WINNERS  
OR TWO LOSERS 
 
Both California’s cage-free egg legislation and Missouri’s ban on the use of the 
word meat for plant-based alternatives have been challenged as violating the DCC.91 
The California-Missouri animal-protection-versus-meat-industry battle shares an-
other ironic twist that bears mention: it was Missouri that sued California over its 
cage-free egg measures.92 Thus, Missouri does not want California’s legislation to 
intrude on Missouri’s business, but Missouri wants its legislation to control out-of-
state businesses, including California’s. 
Other articles have addressed state laws that incidentally burden activities in 
other states,93 and some articles have even addressed animal-welfare laws that 
                                                   
86 Complaint, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Richardson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (W.D. 
Mo. 2019) (No. 2:18-cv-04173). 
87 Id. at ¶ 109. 
88 Id. at ¶ 111. 
89 Turtle Island Foods v. Richardson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1141 (M.D. Mo. 2019) 
(order denying preliminary injunction) (denying the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary in-
junction, at least in part because the plaintiffs’ labeling already includes “qualifiers” that 
clarify that the products are plant-based rather than animal-derived), appeal docketed, No. 
19-3154 (8th Cir. Oct. 4, 2019). 
90 See infra Part IV.A. 
91 See supra Part II.A–B.  
92 Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2014). In fact, in the Missouri v. 
Harris litigation, the State of Missouri vigorously argued against the California statute with 
these words: “[W]e are talking about a statute that effectively blocks, at the California border, 
eggs from out of state that don’t comply with California’s own notions of proper animal 
husbandry.” Id. at 1069. After Missouri’s meat-labeling statute, we could swap out “Califor-
nia” for “Missouri” and “eggs” for “plant-based meat”: “We are talking about a statute that 
effectively blocks, at the Missouri border, plant-based meat from out of state that do[es]n’t 
comply with Missouri’s own notions of proper [advertising or naming standards].”  
93 E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in 
a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 636–38 (2007); DeVeaux, supra note 34, at 
1006; Weed Wars, supra note 29, 31–32; Reefer Madness, supra note 29, at 889–91.  
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incidentally burden other states.94 In particular, the scholarship addressing animal-
welfare laws falls roughly into two camps. On the one hand, some scholars find that 
animal-welfare laws survive the pliant DCC restriction, but these scholars tend to 
use language that strongly suggests Missouri’s meat-labeling legislation should also 
survive. On the other hand, some scholars believe animal-welfare laws fail the DCC, 
using a test that would almost certainly strike down Missouri’s meat-language law. 
This part of the Article reviews the solutions posited by others; then, in Part V, this 
Article sets forth a theoretical and analytical framework for resolving these disputes 
to ensure animal-protection laws survive the DCC challenge, while meat-language 
laws fail the challenge. 
 
A.  Two Winners 
 
One outcome of the dual DCC challenge—one against animal-welfare laws and 
one against meat-labeling laws—is that both sorts of laws survive scrutiny. This, in 
fact, is a likely result if lawyers, courts, and scholars emphasize the low-level bal-
ancing test that applies to anti-obstructionist laws under the DCC. Recall that these 
laws survive as long as the out-of-state harm does not clearly outweigh the in-state 
benefits. 
For example, Professor Jeffrey Schmitt proposed that California’s animal-wel-
fare legislation does not run afoul of the DCC because these laws meet the balancing 
test.95 He explains that “in-state conduct violates the extraterritoriality principle only 
when the regulation: (1) lacks a corresponding in-state interest; and (2) inescapably 
has the practical effect of regulating conduct beyond the state’s borders.”96 Under 
such a test, a court would uphold California’s cage-free egg requirement because 
“[a]lthough California’s legislation regulates the out-of-state production of . . . eggs 
bound for the California market,” California maintains “an interest in making sure 
that its citizens do not participate in animal cruelty . . . .”97 Moreover, out-of-state 
producers can choose to comply with California’s laws and change their production 
methods, or they may choose not to sell in California, “meaning that such effects are 
not ‘inescapable.’”98 Nor does California’s law require producers “to change their 
operations with respect to products sold in other states.”99 Professor Schmitt con-
cludes that the California legislation passes constitutional muster because “Califor-
nia’s legislation simply does not, indeed cannot, interfere with another state’s power 
to enact or enforce its own legislation on these subjects.”100 
                                                   
94 Schmitt, supra note 41, at 441–47; Hernández-López, supra note 7, 366–69; Gull-
man, supra note 41, at 458–63.  
95 See Schmitt, supra note 41, at 447–48. 
96 Id. at 425 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 429, 449 (providing similar formula-
tions of the proposed test).  
97 Id. at 425.  
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 426.  
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Professor Schmitt’s approach focuses on the availability of options to the out-
of-state business affected. In his view, the opportunity to choose to do business by 
changing business practices, or not to do business in a particular state and therefore 
keeping business practices the same, lessens or even obviates the existence of an 
immediate burden on the out-of-state business. When the small (or nonexistent) out-
of-state burden is compared to the in-state benefits, the latter clearly outweighs the 
former. The court should uphold California’s animal-welfare legislation. 
Nevertheless, this framework provides a roadmap for upholding Missouri’s 
meat-labeling law. After all, Missouri has an interest in the production of meat in 
Missouri. Moreover, Missouri’s law would not force plant-based meat producers to 
change the packaging of their products sold in states other than Missouri. And if the 
producers would like to sell in Missouri, they can do so simply by changing their 
packaging (either just for Missouri or nationwide). Alternatively, these producers 
may keep their packaging as-is while forgoing the Missouri market. Finally, Mis-
souri’s law does not, and cannot, interfere with another state’s power to enact or 
enforce its own legislation on these matters; those other states can prohibit or require 
their own labeling. Missouri’s law comfortably fits in the “wide latitude” given to 
states in regulating in-state conduct.101 In fact, using reasoning like this, several cir-
cuit courts have upheld other types of labeling laws,102 which further suggests that 
this sort of analysis would validate Missouri’s law. 
In sum, the application of Professor Schmitt’s analysis from the animal-protec-
tion realm would support the affirmation of Missouri’s meat-labeling law.103 
 
B.  Two Losers 
 
Under a different analysis, neither of the laws highlighted in this Article would 
survive DCC scrutiny. This result occurs if courts focus their attention on the out-
of-state effects of the legislation. Both California’s animal-welfare laws and Mis-
souri’s meat-labeling law unquestionably have effects outside the borders of the 
states in which they were enacted, thus harming out-of-state interests. 
Professor Bethany Gullman, for example, explains that California’s animal-
welfare legislation is both protectionist and that it lacks sufficient in-state interests 
to counterbalance the harmful out-of-state effects: 
 
                                                   
101 Id. at 427. 
102 See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 644–50 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(finding Ohio law banning dairy producers from certain misleading labeling about hormones 
survived Pike test); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108–13 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(reversing award of preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a Vermont law requiring 
labeling of products containing mercury).  
103 Cf. Grant, supra note 43, at 71 (“A state’s regulation of a food product is therefore 
likely to be upheld on state constitutional grounds as a valid exercise of a state’s power to 
protect the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”).  
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The regulations in California . . . likely violate the [DCC] by regulating 
conduct outside [California’s] borders. The California regulations likely 
have a discriminatory purpose and would be invalidated on strict scrutiny 
review. Even if the purpose was not found to be discriminatory and the 
law was determined to have only incidental effects on interstate com-
merce, the burden of each law in California . . . outweighs the minor value 
of the legitimate local purpose.104 
 
This analysis predicts that animal-welfare legislation will be analyzed under the 
anti-protectionist prong of the DCC, subjected to strict scrutiny, and struck down. 
As a second line of attack, Professor Gullman posits that even if courts analyze ani-
mal-welfare legislation under the lenient anti-obstructionist framework of the DCC, 
the “minor value” of the in-state benefits cannot outweigh the heavy burden on in-
terstate commerce. 
Professor Gullman’s analysis would also likely compel a court to invalidate 
Missouri’s meat ban. As explored more in Part V, infra, Missouri’s legislature has 
an interest in protecting its meat industry,105 which should trigger the anti-protec-
tionist framework’s strict scrutiny. Laws rarely survive this strict scrutiny, and there 
is nothing suggesting that meat-labeling laws are so important that they should. Pro-
fessor Gullman, however, continues her analysis of California’s animal-welfare 
laws, stating that even if California’s laws are not discriminatory and only inci-
dentally burden interstate commerce, “the burden of the law in California . . . out-
weighs [its] minor value . . . .”106 If that is true of the animal-protection laws, then 
similarly, even if Missouri’s meat-labeling law were not discriminatory and only 
incidentally affected interstate commerce, the legislation would probably fail the 
balancing test. Missouri would have to identify a local, non-protectionist purpose of 
the law. The most likely non-protectionist purpose is requiring clear labels to stave 
off consumer confusion as to which products are animal-based and which are plant-
based. But this purpose has weight only if consumers are indeed confused, and there 
has been no evidence of consumer confusion. On the contrary, plant-based products 
are already prominently labeled as such.107 Thus, whatever marginal confusion is 
allayed by the meat-labeling law is more than offset by the burdens imposed on out-
of-state businesses needing to change their labeling practices or forgo the Missouri 
market. 
In sum, this sort of analysis would likely invalidate both California’s animal-
welfare laws and Missouri’s meat-language ban.108 
 
                                                   
104 Gullman, supra note 41, at 464. 
105 Gibson, supra note 27 (explaining that the law’s purpose is to “protect ranchers”).  
106 Gullman, supra note 41, at 464.  
107 See Preliminary Injunction Order cited infra note 131, at 24 (rejecting consumer 
confusion in meat-labeling case). 
108 This analysis would likely invalidate many other laws as well, including the labeling 
laws mentioned supra note 102. 
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C.  Concluding Remarks for the Dual Winner/Dual Loser Framework 
 
Neither Professor Schmitt nor Professor Gullman analyzed the meat-labeling 
laws; nor could they as their articles predate Missouri’s law, which was the first on 
the subject. But the analytical frameworks they use suggest outcomes for the Mis-
souri-type laws as well. 
Professor Schmitt focuses on an out-of-state business’s choice on whether to 
comply with an in-state law. The same reasoning that he uses to support animal-
welfare laws would also allow meat-labeling laws to pass muster. A better focus—
one perhaps not needed in 2015 in a world without meat-labeling laws—considers 
the purpose of the laws and not simply their effects on choice. Professor Gullman’s 
analysis properly considers legislative purpose, but as explored below in Part V, 
improperly ascribes a primarily protectionist purpose to California’s animal-welfare 
legislation. If purpose is to be the touchstone of the DCC analysis, we must take care 
in properly identifying the reasons motivating the enactment of state legislation. 
 
V.  PROPER OUTCOME OF THE DCC BATTLES: ONE LAW SURVIVES  
AND ONE LAW SUCCUMBS 
 
Under the frameworks addressed in Part IV, supra, the courts would likely find 
either that both statutes survive or that both should be struck down. This Part builds 
a template for separating the constitutional animal-protection statutes from the un-
constitutional meat-labeling ones. 
 
A.  Health and Safety Laws Survive, but Protectionist Laws Fall 
 
Stating that both California’s animal-welfare legislation and Missouri’s meat 
statute have out-of-state effects, interfere with interstate commerce and business 
transactions, and are thus suspect under the DCC, does not resolve the constitution-
ality question. If “out-of-state effects” were the sole test, then both laws must fail. 
Nor is it sufficient to say that a state law’s offer of choice to an out-of-state business 
will salvage the law. Forgoing market participation may, for practical and economic 
reasons, be no choice at all. And often a law in one state prompts laws in other states, 
so these businesses may have to adapt to a patchwork of different state laws or forgo 
participation in multiple markets. 
The key to separating the winners from the losers is putting the laws in their 
proper analytical frameworks of the DCC. Animal-welfare legislation should be 
challenged as violating the anti-obstructionist portion of the DCC, and the meat-
labeling statutes should be challenged as violating the anti-protectionist function of 
the DCC. These two different strands of the DCC entail different levels of review, 
and because the anti-obstructionist lens is a rational-basis-balancing-type frame-
work, the animal-protection laws should survive. On the other hand, the anti-protec-
tionist function of the DCC subjects laws to strict scrutiny, and so the meat-labeling 
laws should fail. 
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Animal-welfare laws have “long been recognized as part of the historic police 
power[s] of the States.”109 State legislatures passing animal-protection laws explic-
itly rely on police powers language about regulating health, safety, and welfare. For 
example, in 2010, when California’s legislature banned the sale of out-of-state eggs 
that did not meet certain welfare standards that already applied to in-state produc-
ers,110 the legislature explained that the purpose of the law was to “protect California 
consumers from the deleterious health, safety, and welfare effects of the sale and 
consumption of eggs derived from egg-laying hens that are exposed to significant 
stress and may result in increased exposure to disease pathogens including salmo-
nella.”111 Thus, the members of the legislature explicitly relied on human health jus-
tifications for their statute. 
Those findings relate specifically to the salmonella risk from caged hens, but 
even more generally, current industrial animal farming methods may “present[] an 
unacceptable level of risk to public health and damage to the environment.”112 In-
tensive confinement for farm animals should be eliminated “given the interrelation 
between animal conditions and their welfare, food safety, and public health.”113 
Laws like California’s cage-free egg requirement that require more space, sunlight, 
and natural behavior for animals thus fit snugly within the state’s police powers be-
cause mistreatment of farm animals, poor animal health, and environmental degra-
dation directly and negatively affect human health and wellbeing. 
Therefore, even though these animal-welfare laws affect out-of-state busi-
nesses, which must choose whether to comply with the different standards or forgo 
the market, these laws also have a significant in-state purpose that is not solely or 
primarily related to protecting in-state industry.114 These laws should pass muster 
under the relatively relaxed balancing test of the anti-obstructionist prong of the 
                                                   
109 DeHart v. Town of Austin, Ind., 39 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Planned 
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, No. 17-3163, 2018 WL 
3655854, at *5 (7th Cir. June 25, 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“[A]nimal welfare af-
fects human welfare. Many people feel disgust, humiliation, or shame when animals or their 
remains are poorly treated.”); 3B C.J.S. ANIMALS § 198 (2020) (writing that statutory provi-
sions prohibiting cruelty to animals “are sustainable as a valid exercise of the police power”); 
see also Daly, supra note 6 (noting that the Director of Legislative Affairs at the Animal 
Legal Defense Fund considers state animal protection laws to constitute a reflection of 
“Americans’ growing concern for the wellbeing of animals”). 
110 A.B. 1437, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). Moreover, the requirements 
imposed on out-of-state producers were already imposed on in-state producers—thus provid-
ing no competitive advantage to in-state business interests except in the sense that the new 
law levels the playing field. Id. 
111 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25995(e) (West 2018). 
112 Hernández-López, supra note 7, at 392 (citing Robert P. Martin, Preface to PEW 
COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Pro-
duction in America, at vii–ix, 56–59 (Jeffrey T. Olson ed., 2008)). 
113 Id. at 393. 
114 Indeed, as noted supra note 110, these laws also apply to in-state egg producers.  
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DCC because the in-state human health benefits are not clearly and substantially 
outweighed by the interference with out-of-state businesses. 
On the other hand, with respect to Missouri’s labeling law for meat-alternative 
products, proponents and legislators primarily and often explicitly relied on the pur-
pose of protecting Missouri’s meat industry from competition.115 The meat industry 
fears losing market share to companies that make plant-based meat alternatives and 
is actively pushing state legislatures to enact labeling laws in order to protect the 
meat and dairy farms.116 In support of Missouri’s meat-labeling law, Mike Deering, 
the Executive Vice President of the Missouri Cattleman’s Association, said, “[t]his 
is about protecting the integrity of products that farm and ranch families throughout 
                                                   
115 See Jessica Fu, Missouri Lawmakers Pass Bill to Prevent Plant-based Meat Com-
panies from Using the Word “Meat,” THE COUNTER (May 1, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://new-
foodeconomy.org/missouri-house-bill-meat-labeling-restrictions-hcb-16/ [https://perma.cc/ 
GW39-8NM4]; see also Gibson, supra note 27 (noting that the law’s purpose is to “protect 
ranchers”); AP Wire, Judge Declines to Block Missouri Fake-Meat Law, Appeal Claims 
Censorship, FOX4 (Oct. 5, 2019 3:28 PM), https://fox4kc.com/2019/10/05/judge-declines-
to-block-missouri-fake-meat-law-appeal-claims-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/J7MX-
UBZK] (quoting an attorney for the plaintiffs in the suit against Missouri’s meat-labeling 
law as saying that “Missouri passed this law to protect established agriculture interests from 
competitive pressures, not to protect consumers”); Hailey Konnath, Tofurky, ACLU Slam 
Ark. Law Banning “Veggie Burger” Labels, LAW 360 (July 22, 2019, 10:37 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1180855 [https://perma.cc/C88L-R2Y2] (quoting To-
furky’s CEO about Arkansas’s meat-labeling law as saying that “[w]hat’s really going on 
here is that the state of Arkansas is seeking to limit access to healthier, more sustainable food 
choices for its constituents, and it is doing so to benefit the animal agriculture industry”). 
116 Meat eaters are eating more and more plant-based foods. See Michelle Neff, 6 Per-
cent of Americans Now Identify as Vegan—Why This Is a Huge Deal for the Planet, ONE 
GREEN PLANET (2017), https://www.onegreenplanet.org/news/six-percent-of-americans-
identify-as-vegan/ [https://perma.cc/MU3N-8DVV] (“For the past few decades, meat con-
sumption in the U.S. has seen a steady decline. According to recent studies, 30 percent of 
Americans are not only leaving meat off their plates but also seeking out plant-based meat 
alternatives.”); Rich Haridy, The Burger Battle: The Lawsuits Challenging Restrictions on 
Plant-based Meat Labels, NEW ATLAS (July 25, 2019), https://newatlas.com/plant-based-
meat-food-label-law-battle/60748/ [https://perma.cc/3CKG-7WYP] (“A striking 95 percent 
of these plant-based burgers are reportedly being consumed by meat-eaters, and while beef 
burger consumption has not dropped over the last 12 months, growth has been flat. Consum-
ers are undeniably open to trying meat alternatives, especially when those alternatives in-
creasingly resemble traditional meat products.”). These trends have led industrial meat farm-
ers to promote laws like Missouri’s ban on the use of the word “meat” to describe plant-
based foods. See Nathaniel Popper, You Call That Meat? Not So Fast, Cattle Ranchers Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/technology/meat-veggie-
burgers-lab-produced.html [https://perma.cc/R9WQ-9GAS] (“In recent weeks, beef and 
farming industry groups have persuaded legislators in more than a dozen states to introduce 
laws that would make it illegal to use the word meat to describe burgers and sausages that 
are created from plant-based ingredients or are grown in labs.”).  
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the country work hard to raise each and every day.”117 House Representative Jeff 
Knight, a former livestock auctioneer, made the protectionist point even more 
clearly: “We wanted to protect our farmers from misleading advertising that could 
negatively impact Missouri farmers . . . .”118 Thus, Missouri’s law relies on explicitly 
protectionist rhetoric.119 
Opponents of Missouri’s law have also pointed out the protectionist purpose of 
these laws: they “don’t seem to be directed at solving a problem in the marketplace[, 
but rather seem to be] about fighting off competition”;120 “Missouri passed this law 
to protect established agriculture interests from competitive pressures, not to protect 
consumers.”121 
So, Missouri’s meat-labeling ban interferes with interstate markets in plant-
based goods—which currently label their products as “meat[s],” “burgers,” or other 
such descriptions122—and these producers will need to change their labels or cease 
                                                   
117 Gibson, supra note 27. 
118 Fu, supra note 115. Note that this claim is phrased in terms of protecting the meat 
industry and also protecting consumers; however, the consumers are “protected” as a way to 
protect the industry. There is no evidence that consumers are confused by plant-based meats. 
See Preliminary Injunction Order cited infra note 131, at 24. 
119 Unfortunately, “Missouri does not preserve legislative history.” Nixon v. Shrink 
Miss. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 393 (2000). In that case, lawyers relied on a senator’s affi-
davit regarding the law’s purpose, and the district court noted contemporaneous newspaper 
reports. Id. With respect to the meat-labeling laws, advocates must likewise be creative and 
discern intent through other evidence, such as individual legislators’ statements of why they 
are voting for a particular bill and newspaper reports relaying such statements.   
Legislators in other states that have considered meat-labeling laws also tend to rely on 
protectionism. For example, in Arizona, Representative David Cook supported a similar ban 
on certain meat and dairy words because it would protect the cattle industry. Howard Fischer, 
Lawmakers Ban Sale of ‘Almond Milk’ as Well as “Meatless ‘Meat,’ CASA GRANDE 
DISPATCH (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.pinalcentral.com/casa_grande_dispatch/area_news/ 
lawmakers-ban-sale-of-almond-milk-as-well-as-meatless/article_560a4b40-aefc-527d-8439 
-237ce5d7d910.html [https://perma.cc/T4SP-KM86]; see H.B. 2604, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2019), https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/54leg/1R/bills/HB2604P.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RJC-MUYV]. 
120 Popper, supra note 116 (quoting Sarah Sorscher of the Center for Science in the 
Public Interest); see also Haridy, supra note 116 (quoting a source as saying, “[o]ur labels 
are not trying to trick consumers into buying our vegan foods,” and “[w]e aim to clearly 
communicate what our foods are made from for those actively seeking vegan foods and oth-
ers considering incorporating them into their diet. [The meat-labeling laws are] not about 
clearing up consumer confusion, [but] about stifling competition and putting plant-based 
companies at a disadvantage in the marketplace.”). 
121 AP Wire, supra note 115. 
122 Cf. Watson, supra note 13. For example, Beyond Meat and Impossible Burger use 
meat-based terminology. See BEYOND MEAT, https://www.beyondmeat.com/products/the-
beyond-burger/ [https://perma.cc/KTK5-5B67] (last visited July 19, 2020); Meet Impossible 
Burger, IMPOSSIBLE FOODS, https://impossiblefoods.com/burger/ [https://perma.cc/T8CZ-
YQQW] (last visited July 20, 2020). Tofurky calls its products sausage, ham, and deli meat, 
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selling their products in states like Missouri to protect themselves from legal chal-
lenges. Additionally, Missouri’s meat-labeling ban serves a disfavored protectionist 
purpose. This combination of out-of-state harm coupled with a protectionist purpose 
should place these laws in the anti-protectionist category for purposes of DCC anal-
ysis and subject them to strict scrutiny. Laws rarely survive this rigorous analysis, 
and Missouri’s law should be no exception.123 
Thus, these two sorts of state laws—both potentially problematic under the 
DCC because they impose burdens on interstate commerce—fall under two different 
analyses courts have used in applying the DCC. On the one hand, although Califor-
nia’s cage-free egg requirements interfere with an interstate market in eggs, the Cal-
ifornia legislation has a permissible purpose of protecting the health of California 
residents.124 The in-state and non-protectionist benefits keep these laws out of the 
anti-protectionist category of the DCC and allow the lenient balancing test to apply, 
so these laws should survive judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, Missouri’s meat-
labeling ban for plant-based foods interferes with an interstate market in those alter-
native products, and the Missouri legislature acted with the impermissible purpose 
of protecting in-state meat producers from out-of-state competition. The purpose 
that motivated this law suggests it should be analyzed under the anti-protectionist 
prong of the DCC and subjected to the highest form of scrutiny. Missouri’s law will 
fail strict scrutiny. There are other, better-tailored means of ensuring consumers pur-
chase animal-based products, rather than plant-based ones, if those are the products 
the consumers wish to buy. For example, plant-based products should be promi-
nently labeled as such. Moreover, there are other means of helping in-state ranchers 
if that is desired—perhaps tax breaks or other subsidies should be considered. As 
Missouri’s law is written, however, it should not survive a DCC challenge.  
In short, as these laws stand currently, under appropriate DCC analyses, Mis-
souri’s meat-labeling law fails and California’s animal-welfare laws survive.125 
                                                   
among others. See generally TOFURKY, https://tofurky.com/ [https://perma.cc/2T3X-GX5L] 
(last visited July 19, 2020). These companies also prominently label their foods as vegan or 
plant-based. But under many Missouri-type laws, the other, plant-based descriptors are irrel-
evant as long as the labels also include meat terminology.  
123 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986) (“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, 
or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have 
generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.”). 
124 Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that the 
purpose is “to protect California consumers from the deleterious, health, safety, and welfare 
effects”). 
125 When state legislatures pass meat-labeling (or similar) laws in the future, they may 
disguise the true purpose of these laws, refusing to acknowledge that the laws primarily pro-
tect ranchers or other in-state businesses, but instead couching the laws as protecting their 
citizens from confusing or misleading labeling, or protecting citizens’ health from the dele-
terious effects of pea protein or high-sodium plant-based alternatives. As labeling proponents 
and state legislatures become more sophisticated, the litigation strategy noted here will also 
have to become more sophisticated. But for now, legislatures are passing meat-labeling laws 
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There is a winner and a loser in these battles between industrial meat farmers and 
producers of plant-based alternatives. 
 
B.  A Roadmap for Future Battles: Protecting Animal-Welfare Laws  
from DCC Challenges 
 
Protecting animal welfare through legislation begins with lawmakers, particu-
larly state legislators, as they must pass legislation in ways that will help the laws 
survive DCC challenges. Because most animal-welfare laws affect out-of-state busi-
nesses, legislators must pass these laws for health, safety, or welfare purposes. State 
legislators can aid in that regard by making explicit findings.126 General safety-type 
statements may not be sufficient; protectionist language favoring in-state business 
over out-of-state business should surely be avoided. Instead, state legislatures should 
specify the particular animal cruelty they are eschewing and the attendant health, 
safety, and environmental concerns they are promoting for the consuming public.127 
In particular, articulating specific health concerns rooted in fear of contamination, 
salmonella, hormones, antibiotics, or other pathogens would provide a better chance 
that the law will be subjected to the anti-obstructionist balancing standard rather than 
the anti-protectionist strict scrutiny standard and hence will be upheld. Environmen-
tal concerns regarding the degradation of the local environment, particularly if cou-
pled with human health concerns, should also suffice to trigger the balancing test’s 
lower standard. 
Lawyers may also help structure legal arguments and marshal evidence to help 
animal-welfare laws survive legal challenges—or fend off such challenges alto-
gether. When challenging a meat-labeling law as violative of the DCC, lawyers must 
advise the court that the law is protectionist legislation subject to the strict standard 
of review applicable to those sorts of DCC challenges. When seeking to uphold an 
animal-welfare law against a DCC challenge, lawyers must be sure to show why 
                                                   
with express protectionist purposes, contrary to the proscriptions of the DCC. Cf. Dep’t of 
Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2251, 2593–95 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that the citizenship question on the census is impermissible be-
cause the reason provided by the Commerce Secretary was not credible, but leaving open the 
possibility that the question could be added if supported by a better reason).  
126 See Grant, supra note 43, at 101 (“If a legislature decides to pass a foie gras law 
based on animal cruelty concerns . . . it should clearly state its reasons for doing so and make 
specific conclusions about the cruelty involved . . . and its effect on the local government or 
population. The more specific and extensive a legislature’s findings are, the more hesitant a 
court will be to overturn the political will of another co-equal branch of the government.”). 
127 See Reid, supra note 79, at 20 (quoting Donald P. Rothschild, A Proposed “Tonic” 
with Florida Lime to Celebrate Our New Federalism: How to Deal with the “Headache” of 
Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 829, 842 (1984)) (“‘When, however, the state claims that 
its regulation is an exercise of its police power, the state still has the burden of showing the 
significant health and safety benefits of the regulation, in order to tip the scale in favor of the 
regulation.’”). 
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these laws are not merely about helping out home-state businesses, but instead ame-
liorate health, safety, or welfare concerns. Keeping these two sorts of laws in their 
respective spheres will clarify why animal-welfare laws should survive a DCC chal-
lenge while meat-labeling laws should not survive. 
Finally, continued investigation into the treatment of animals and how animal 
welfare affects human health will help support legislative and legal efforts. Some 
cheese products portray their cows as frolicking happily in idyllic green meadows; 
some meat producers show organic chickens roaming freely in lush outdoor fields 
with no cages or fences. These labels suggest that happy animals produce nutritious 
products that feed healthy humans. The reality of some factory farming practices is 
markedly different and, as recent reports show, “presents an unacceptable level of 
risk to public health and damage to the environment.”128 As more evidence comes 
to light about the conditions in which farm animals are kept and the health of those 
animals, more states may choose to pass laws like California’s cage-size require-
ments. And as more states do so, their legislatures should explicitly rely on their 
police powers in enacting these laws. 
These three factors—the investigations into factory farming, the legislative 
findings, and the lawyering process—should work together to ensure that animal-
welfare laws continue to be enacted and, if challenged, ultimately upheld. 
Notably, the objection may be raised that this analytical framework will help 
the meat industry succeed in passing more restrictive labeling requirements or other 
laws impeding competition from plant-based alternative products. After all, legisla-
tures passing a meat-labeling law could assert health, safety, and consumer protec-
tion motivations, rather than the protectionist purposes relied on to this point.129 It is 
true the industrial meat lobby may become more sophisticated, but it is still less 
likely to benefit from this framework than the animal-welfare industry for at least 
two reasons. First, the industry now has a record of relying on protectionism to sup-
port its laws; it should be difficult for courts to ignore this historical evidence.130 
Second, there seem to be two potential health or welfare justifications that support a 
meat-labeling law: (1) consumer confusion about what products come from an ani-
mal carcass and what products do not, and (2) plant-based meats may be high in 
sodium, soy, or other ingredients that may be unhealthy in large doses. But neither 
reason actually supports a Missouri-type meat-labeling law. There is no documented 
                                                   
128 Hernández-López, supra note 7, at 392 (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). 
129 Of course, as the stated purpose of the laws changes, the litigation response must 
change as well. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2251, 2593–95 (2019) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
130 See generally McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 677, 679 (2005) (dis-
allowing a Ten Commandments display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (allowing 
a Ten Commandments display). The difference in result may be attributed, at least in part, to 
the forty-year history of the display in Van Orden. 545 U.S. at 678. History matters, and 
although the meat-labeling laws are fairly new, they have been passed using the language of 
protectionism. This history should be hard for legislatures to erase or for courts to ignore. 
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consumer confusion of what is animal-derived meat and what is plant-derived meat; 
nor is there any evidence that consumers misunderstand any existing labeling on this 
point.131 Plant-based meats prominently say “vegan,” “vegetarian,” or “plant-based” 
because purchasers desire and seek out—and often pay extra for—those attributes. 
Moreover, many grocery stores place plant-based meats in a section separate from 
the animal meats. The potential health value of products, whether meat or non-meat, 
may require labeling, but that is a separate concern from whether consumers are 
confused by the use of meat-related terms on a label. For example, product labels 
regularly warn of soy, egg, gluten, or other ingredients that may create health or 
                                                   
131 In granting a preliminary injunction to Tofurky against enforcement of a similar 
Arkansas meat labeling law, Judge Baker wrote as follows: “The State appears to believe 
that the simple use of the word ‘burger,’ ‘ham,’ or ‘sausage’ leaves the typical consumer 
confused, but such a position requires the assumption that a reasonable consumer will disre-
gard all other words found on the label.” Preliminary Injunction Order, at 24, Turtle Island 
Foods v. Soman, No. 4:19-cv-00514-KGB (E.D. Ark.). The judge noted that the State’s “as-
sumption is unwarranted” because “[t]he labels in the record evidence include ample termi-
nology to indicate the vegan or vegetarian nature of the products.” Id. The judge also re-
viewed the seven Tofurky labels in the record and concluded that each label, although using 
“meat” terms like “burger” or “chorizo,” was not misleading because of other qualifiers and 
descriptors on the packaging: 
 
The “Veggie Burger” label has the word “veggie” modifying the word 
“burger” and includes the words “all vegan” in the middle of the package. Further, 
the “Veggie Burger” label features the words “white quinoa” next to a picture of 
the burger. The “Deli Slices” label also includes the words “all vegan” in the mid-
dle of the label, features the words “plant-based” next to a picture of the product, 
and describes the product as “smoked ham style.” The “Chorizo Style Sausage” 
label includes the words “all vegan” and states that the product was “made with 
pasture raised plants.” The “Slow Roasted Chick’n” label has the words “all ve-
gan” right next to the product’s name and describes the product as “plant-based” 
in the bottom left corner. The “Original Sausage Kielbasa” label includes the 
words “all vegan” next to the word “sausage” and identifies the product as 
“Polish-style wheat gluten and tofu sausages.” The “Hot Dogs” label has the 
words “all vegan” next to the word “dogs” and “plant-based” under the word 
“dogs.” The “Vegetarian Ham Roast” has the word “vegetarian” modifying the 
words “ham roast[.”] Each of these labels also features the letter “V” in a circle 
on the front of the packaging, a common indicator that a food product is vegan or 
vegetarian. Finally, each of these labels features the company name “Tofurky,” 
which clearly contains the word “tofu” in a play on the word “turkey.”  
 
Id. at 23–24 (citations omitted). In granting the preliminary injunction in Tofurky’s favor, 
the court concluded, “the Court finds that Tofurky is likely to prevail in demonstrating that 
Act 501 does not advance the stated governmental interest of protecting consumers from 
being misled or confused . . . .” Id. at 27–28. 
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allergen concerns.132 But it is true that as this area becomes more evolved and those 
involved in the legislative process become more sophisticated, the framework used 
to attack or support these laws will necessarily need to change. Law is not static. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In the end, Congress may wish to exercise its authority and set national stand-
ards for animal welfare and product labeling. Congress, of course, may pass laws 
that interfere with interstate commerce. For Congress, “the commerce clause is not 
dormant” but is express, enabling Congress to enact nationwide legislation on these 
issues.133 
But until Congress does so, state legislatures will fill the void and regulate in 
this field. Some may follow California’s path and enact animal-welfare legislation; 
others may follow Missouri’s path and pass laws to protect the meat industry. Both 
types of laws then may be challenged as violating the DCC. Under the analysis pro-
posed in this Article, California-type animal-protection laws should survive these 
challenges, while Missouri-type meat-labeling laws should fail. 
The analytical framework is now clear: the DCC can be awakened from its 
slumber when laws like Missouri’s are passed for protectionist reasons, while the 
DCC may remain somnolent when laws like California’s are passed for welfare rea-
sons. 
                                                   
132 This sort of labeling law, too, may be subject to a DCC challenge because the out-
of-state producers of these products will need to change their labels to conform to unique 
state laws. But these laws seem less problematic for a few reasons. First, they do not target 
plant-based food in order to protect in-state industry; all food high in sodium, including in-
state and meat-based foods, would need such labels. Second, because fifty different labeling 
laws across the country would be burdensome, this seems like an area ripe for Congress to 
intervene and set a national standard. 
133 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (David S. 
Tanenhaus ed., 2008). 
